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Abstract 
The use of personal devices in the work environment has crossed the boundaries of work and socially related 
tasks. With cyber criminals seriously targeting healthcare for medical identity theft, the lack of control of new 
technologies within healthcare networks becomes an increasing vulnerability. The prolific adoption of personal 
mobile devices in the healthcare environment requires a proactive approach to the management of Bring Your 
Own Device (BYOD). This paper analysed the current state of the problem and the challenges that this creates in 
an environment that has stringent privacy and security requirements. The discourse demonstrates that the issue is 
not solely technology based and requires a broader approach that is inclusive of technology yet needs an 
expansive and socially based perspective. Until the use of mobile technology outside the BYOD environment is 
understood better, definitive guidance for managing BYOD in healthcare will not provide sufficient and 
acceptable protection, although it is a sound starting point. It is imperative that healthcare rapidly catches up 
with BYOD use and steps up to the challenge of embracing the technology and human behaviour associated with 
its user, otherwise, the ‘horse will have bolted’ before any control can be established. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bring your own device (BYOD) refers to the use of personally owned computing devices in the workplace for 
connectivity to the secure organisational network, and access organisational applications and resources. BYOD 
has become widespread in corporations, hospitals and universities, which permit users to access the 
organisational network using a wide range of personal devices (ACMA, 2013). The use of devices such as 
laptops, smartphones, and tablets, has wide appeal and value, in the familiarity of use, and access to a diverse 
range of personal and work-related applications and data. BYOD is in stark contrast to IT departments 
mandating specific hardware and technology, and is fuelled by the advent of Apple’s iPhone, and subsequently 
the iPad (Maas360, 2014). From the user perspective, it is frustrating to know that a particular given task can be 
accomplished in a faster or easier way using an alternative Web browser, operating system, or application, and 
users’ perceive they are handicapped by “supported products” dictated by the IT department. Interestingly, it is 
IT professionals, opting to upgrade sooner and self-manage to get the benefits of new versions of products 
(Jones, 2012), that have led this adoption.  
 “A striking 81 percent of healthcare providers allow employees to use their own mobile devices to connect to 
the hospital network, and more than half of employees take part in the BYOD movement”. (Ponemon Institute, 
2014). It is this integration of personal devices with the work environment that crosses the boundaries of work-
personal communication and tasks. Even in institutions where the IT department still decree specific operating 
systems, hardware platforms, and mobile devices, rogue employees have worked around those requirements to 
get the job done (Crank, 2014).  
One of the issues with BYOD in an environment predominantly unaware of the security risks and not proactive 
in controlling the use of personal devices, is a lack of appropriate policy for BYOD (Curtis, 2014). It is 
unfortunate that organisations, up to 70% in the UK, do not have BYOD strategies or policies in place, yet do 
not prevent employees using their own devices. With cyber criminals taking healthcare seriously for targeted 
medical identity theft, the vulnerability of using mobile devices in healthcare organisations becomes more 
difficult to control (Institute for Health Technology Transformation, 2014). The attacks are more prevalent, 
having doubled in the last three years (Ponemon Institute, 2014), and it is reported that 43% of identity theft in 
2013 was medically related (Ollove, 2014). The emergence of attacks on health data are now common in the 
media, and involve both security breaches and data loss (Gold, 2014; Mearian, 2012;Munro, 2014). 
28
The overburdening of Chief Information Officers and increasing legislation means that addressing BYOD is yet 
another aspect of security and privacy that is often too difficult for healthcare organisations, particularly smaller 
healthcare entities such as primary care providers. More problematic is the hospital environment where multiple 
users require immediate access and multiple IT-networks are required. For instance, the requirements include 
administration, patient and clinical networks, integration of medical devices, complexity access management 
where transfer and storage of medical data is undertaken. Scalability of such networks, and the number of 
authorised users, represents an additional layer of complexity in the management of the clinical network. 
Therefore, the addition of BYOD poses a massive potential security threat as well as a major security 
management issue for IT departments in trying to adhere and integrate BYOD into an already complex network.  
This paper discusses BYOD use in healthcare and highlights the risks this setting presents. In addition, the 
parameters that influence the security of BYOD and the multiple contributing factors of integrating mobile 
technology and applications with potentially sensitive information into healthcare IT-networks are presented. 
The analysis of these issues results in a discourse on the types of recommendations that could be applied to the 
management of BYOD within the healthcare environment. It further suggests how security and flexibility may 
be maintained in the transition from traditional information access to BYOD.  
ADJUSTING TO A MOBILE WORLD 
In healthcare, particularly secondary and tertiary care, mobility and access to multiple workstations is essential 
to support effective workflow. Traditionally this is facilitated by organisational dictation of applications, 
software, and hardware, together with administrator passwords centrally controlled, albeit with poor control of 
access (Filkins, 2014). Indeed, there is a growing expectation and demand for freedom to use personal devices 
for work, accessing the healthcare network to perform daily tasks (Free, 2014). Users are extremely resourceful 
and if new technology can assist and make their role more effective, then this will be adopted, even if the use is 
‘under the radar’. This shift in acceptability means that organisations would rather not fight the use of personal 
devices for work yet have not taken the initiative to attempt manage this use, or do not have the capability to 
manage its use. There is an inherent difficultly in managing the use of technology that is not in the complete 
control of an IT department (Longo, 2013). The transition to a BYOD environment means major adjustment for 
some organisations, rather than managing a small, predictable set of devices and configurations. BYOD presents 
a complex and dynamic landscape, with many different models of laptops, tablets, and smartphones, running 
Windows, Android, or other operating systems.  
BYOD RISKS IN HEALTHCARE 
The general risks that apply across all domains include device security, application security, and managing the 
environment in terms of interfacing to existing systems. Previously, mobile devices were relatively 
straightforward to manage and secure as they consisted of a uniform distribution of device types, often from a 
single manufacturer or brand, that had limited or no access to organisational data. This allowed consistent 
application of security policy controls, often through a unified management interface supplied by the 
manufacturer. BYOD fundamentally changes this architecture as users bring in their own devices of various 
makes and models, and varying hardware and operating system combinations. As a result, basic security controls 
may not be applied consistently and effectively across the multitude of devices. This may occur even when a 
functional Mobile Device Management (MDM) product is in place, as operating system or app-specific 
vulnerabilities may be able to circumvent existing controls on the device.  
The risks specific to healthcare, in addition to other risks associated generally with mobile devices, include 
capability, information sensitivity, integration with workflow, and the use of associated integrated services and 
applications. Indeed the context of use is “often invisible, mutable and without the necessary security warnings” 
as the contextual environment is not self-evident (Longo, 2013), particularly in a strong commnuity of practice 
based setting, as healthcare is.   
Device Security 
The primary aim for organizations is to deliver business value. Locking down mobile devices and prohibiting the 
use of personal devices may ameliorate some security risks, however policies that are too restrictive will 
influence the adoption or encourage workarounds. The general risks relating to securing mobile devices can be 
categorised as lost and stolen devices, physical access, device ownership, ‘always on’ with increased data access, 
and lack of awareness. There are numerous examples of realisation of these risks in healthcare involving patient 
sensitive information (EYGM, 2013; Williams, 2009; U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2013).  
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Application Security 
Mobile applications (apps) have accelerated the use of mobile devices. From embedded computing applications 
such as real-time location identification and mapping apps to social networking; from productivity tools to 
games; apps have largely driven the smartphone revolution. While apps demonstrate utility that is bound only by 
developer imagination, it also increases the risk of supporting BYOD devices in an organisational environment. 
The two general security risks are supplemented by an additional and important, patient safety risk: 
1. Mobile malware are apps with code embedded that can compromise the security of the device or the 
data stored on the device.  
2. App vulnerabilities exist where they enable access to organisational data. The risk of app vulnerabilities 
is accentuated when the IT department does not manage devices, as this model forgoes remote 
administrative capabilities and the associated control. 
3. Third-party software that provides specific functionality outside the host application and database 
requires secure interoperability with agreed consistent and accountable interfaces. The vulnerabilities 
that such software present are in the form of buffer overflows, input manipulation, and application 
authentication. Such third party software is parasitic in nature as the host system is not aware of, nor has 
an agreed consistent interface to, the application. In a context where assurance of patient safety should 
outweigh all other issues concerning the use of software in healthcare, this is problematic. Whilst, “the 
importance to the healthcare environment is in the benefits that such third party software can provide in 
both the integration of electronic services and in providing facilities such as clinical audit tools and 
healthcare practice analysis” (McCauley & Williams, 2011), international concern is widespread. This 
concern is demonstrated by increasing engagement and development work at International Organisation 
for Standardisation (ISO) in projects related to the safety of mobile devices, medical devices, embedded 
and stand-alone health software. These include ISO 25238 Health informatics -- Classification of safety 
risks from health software; ISO 17791 Health informatics -- Guidance on standards for enabling safety 
in health software; and ISO/IEC 82304 Health software -- Part 1: General requirements for product 
safety. 
Managing the Environment 
A Gartner survey predicted that by the year 2017, half of employers would require employees to supply their 
own device for work purposes (Gartner, 2013). A BYOD environment has more variability in the hardware and 
software versions of devices holding administrative, patient/medical, and organisational data, and providing 
access to this data. This will further decrease the ability of MDMs to manage and consistently apply technical 
security policies to the endpoints. This variation in platforms also complicates device wiping when phones are 
lost, replaced, resold, or upgraded by users, or when there is a change in mobile service provider. Hidden costs 
and user expectations highlight the importance of choosing the right governance and support models.  
Capability 
There is a general lack of capability in many healthcare organisations concerning security and the protection of 
information. (Williams, 2011). This situation is compounded by poor design of security measures within the 
complex environment of healthcare (Coles-Kemp & Williams, 2012), and exacerbated by a lack of appropriate 
documented mobile strategy, policy and procedures to manage mobile and BYOD use (Slabodkin, 2012).  
Information Sensitivity  
The personal nature of health information requires a higher level of protection than other less sensitive 
information. The technological advances and the increasing jurisdictional health and privacy regulations are 
increasing the cognizance of the susceptibility of sensitive medical and patient information to breaches 
(Williams & Hossack, 2013). In Australia, the new Australian Privacy Principles (Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, 2014) demand greater oversight and protection of health related data both in transit 
and at rest. The nature of mobile device functionality in storage and data transfer mean demonstrable alignment 
and conformity to this legislation.  
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Workflow into Service Delivery and Clinical Care  
The recognition of the benefits and hindrances in the use of mobile devices in terms of both regulatory 
frameworks and clinical care workflow can assist in embracing BYOD safely. Delivering the right information 
about the right patient at the right place and time is paramount to high quality healthcare (Prgomet, Georgiou, & 
Westbrook, 2009). The problems with traditional access to clinical information using tethered computers is that 
it does not allow mobility to where the patient is situated, and mobile paper based charts do not allow for real-
time accessibility. There is evidence that the use of mobile devices, improves patient outcomes, for instance 
through the prevention of medication errors due to the increased accessibility of information at the patient 
bedside (Moyer, 2013). 
Integrated Services and Applications 
The increasing bandwidth and imaging application capabilities is one example where sharing information is now 
possible using mobile devices (Donovan, 2013). This raises a number of issues in relation to confidentiality of 
the data and subsequent patient privacy. The use of medical image sharing, for a ‘second-opinion, particularly in 
emergency departments is not uncommon. For instance, an image taken on a mobile phone (even with the 
patient’s consent) presents a number of insecure points of failure. Firstly, the transfer of the image using text 
messaging or email is not a secure transfer; the management of the image sharing once sent is not recorded; 
secure deletion of the image from the mobile phone; protection of the image at the receiver’s end; secure 
deletion of the image from the receiving device; and so on. In addition, if the image is used as part of a 
diagnosis, it should also be added to the patient’s health record. Secure solutions for the transfer and deletion of 
each part of this workflow scenario exists however the problem is the management of the whole workflow 
process and its component parts as the data is recorded, accessed and stored with multiple people in multiple 
locations physically and logically.  
Another issue that is applicable to all organisations who allow BYOD is that of automatic device backup to the 
cloud. This has additional implications for the location of information stored overseas and the requirement of 
equivalent privacy legislation under the Australian Privacy Principles (Williams & Maeder, 2014). Whilst a 
private cloud is a sound idea for healthcare data, the issue with user owned mobile devices is that the cloud 
provisions are often set up automatically i.e. to the platform manufacturer cloud service, for which the user has 
little or no control.  
PROTECTION, GOVERNANCE AND COMPLIANCE 
In addition to the protection of BYOD and integration into the organisational usage parameters, the issues of 
governance with regard to privacy need consideration. Privacy legislation in many countries, such as the 
Australian Privacy Principles (Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 2012), and the EU Privacy 
Directive ("EU Poised to Propose 24Hour Breach Notification Data Privacy Rules 379540" 2012), provide 
additional legislation with ramifications for mobile device management. One approach to address these issues is 
to employ a structure of standards and best practices that acknowledge the complexity of the environment. This 
includes the Safety of Health IT-Networks in the ISO 80001 series, and the ISO 17791 Health informatics -- 
Guidance on standards for enabling safety in health software. Hence, an initial approach to BYOD policy, (to 
begin to ‘herd the cats’), is a set of best practice BYOD guiding principles that specifically address the 
idiosyncrasies of healthcare. 
Healthcare BYOD Guiding Principles.  
Guiding principles are not prescriptive, and rather than suggest policy content, they provide a framework to 
encompass both the technical (usually exclusive) and social (inclusive) necessities. The following guiding 
principles transfer the focus from traditional command and control to a flexible policy-based network 
provisioning that can support personal mobile devices, whilst being cognizant of the environment. These are 
grouped below (to promote initial discussion and deconstruction of the complex environment of use) into policy, 
technical (configuration and monitoring) and social categories (Table 1).  
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Table 1 BYOD Guiding Principles 
Policy 
1 Adopt a structured, standards-based and device agnostic approach to BYOD protection.  
Investigation into user and organisational needs, within a wider environment of information sharing in 
healthcare, is required. For example, physicians may feel that iPads are preferable in the hospital 
because they can be sterilised. This sterilisation is required to prevent the spread of nosocomial 
infections. Environmental and security requirements can be mapped to international standards, and 
consideration of technical solutions such as MDM applications (including remote wiping facilities) 
may fulfil technical protection requirements of such standards.  
2 Ensure a balanced approach to protection and accessibility.  
Understanding and provision for complex healthcare workflow is vital.  
Technical (Configuration & Monitoring) 
Various technical measures are underpinned by initial configuration and monitoring activities.  
3 Establish a mobile device and permissible operating systems list, which can be endorsed on the 
network.  
4 Establish the mandatory applications (or prohibited) for each device.  
5 Establish a user group list 
6 Define who, what, where and when of network access. Role based access is vitally important in the 
management of healthcare information and meeting jurisdictional privacy legislation.  
7 Audit authorized and unauthorized devices, and authorized and unauthorized users  
8 Continuous vulnerability assessment and remediation.  
9 Information protection – encryption for data at rest and data in motion.  
Encryption of data at rest is particularly important on mobile devices that have little other protection. 
In reality the best option, and to meet jurisdictional privacy requirements, personal health information 
should not be stored on a mobile device.  
10 Integrating network segmentation and data segmentation.  
Using application virtualisation facilitates increased control whilst decoupling from device 
dependency. 
Social 
11 Educate users about BYOD risk and BYOD policy.  
Whilst these guidelines provide a general framework to guide initial control of the BYOD environment, what is 
arguably more important, and should drive further investigation and design of effective solutions for healthcare, 
is investigation and a full understanding of how users of BYOD interact with the wider environment outside the 
healthcare environment. The simplicity and convenience of gaining a second opinion, for instance by texting or 
emailing a photo of a patient’s condition, means that an understanding of the information flow involved in such 
an exchange is needed to be able to design effective security solutions. This task should also include how to 
include information collected outside the usual clinical system into the patient record, as well as the persistence 
of any information held on a mobile device.  
CONCLUSION 
The guiding principles proposed provide an inclusive approach to management of BYOD rather than the 
traditional technologically based approach. The issue of privacy of information is front and centre of the risks 
that all patient health data are subjected to. Healthcare organisations need to embrace that patients and healthcare 
providers want to use mobile devices for connection, communication, and for accessing services. It is in this 
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failure that the issues of privacy get lost in security measures to protect devices and data confidentiality. The 
intangible nature of data maligns its value, which in the case of health related data, is not the ‘value’ of the data 
itself but its usefulness in clinical decision-making. The use of this data and how it is handled is paramount to 
managing patient privacy. As Hossack (2014), points out, privacy is a contextual concept. In healthcare when a 
person is well privacy is important, when the same person is ill, privacy is less important than accessing relevant 
information for the best health outcome.  
With the rapid expansion of mobile devices entering the workplace, it is unrealistic to ignore BYOD use, or use 
a blanket approach of preclusion, as users will continue to use non-compliant devices to access the network with 
or without organisational recognition and permission. It is unfortunate that as Forrester’s study (2013) suggests, 
that US information workers revealed that 37% are employing new technologies before formal permissions or 
policies are instituted. Add to this the context of use, necessary workflow, impact of communities of practice, 
and the lack of security capability, and the resulting optimisation in the secure use of BYOD will take time to 
develop.  
Addressing the management and control of BYOD in healthcare is a challenge. It requires a new approach to 
security in healthcare, which encompasses a shift in the technical paradigm making full use of virtualisation and 
data segmentation, whilst including the pragmatic approach to seamless integration into a complex workflow.  
The proliferation of device use without initial control has meant a major vulnerability exists to the healthcare 
industry. As the examples demonstrate, this vulnerability is being exploited and needs to be contained, even 
though this maybe ‘closing the stable door after the horse has bolted’. The recommendations made in this paper 
are a preliminary investigation into an issue that will only become more widespread. It provides a starting point 
to develop solutions that can be readily adopted in healthcare, where the paternalistic approach and interruption 
of workflow that limits health service delivery is resisted. The adoption of multiple methods of collection of, and 
interaction with, health information using a diverse range of technology presents new and major challenges for 
the healthcare environment. Whilst these include the challenges found in other organisational environments, the 
diversity, lack of awareness and critical workflow factors in healthcare provide a scenario more resembling 
herding cats that managing data.   
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